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Introduction
All organizations, be they social, economic,
political, or whatever, face basically the
same problem in order to survive as viable, on-
going entities: they need to attract and retain
a core of activists who will engage in the
activities necessary for achieving the organiza-
tion’s collective goal. Furthermore, the way in
which an organization or its leadership goes
about resolving the problem of recruiting and
retaining organizational activists has
considerable impact upon its internal dynamics
(i.e., its structures and procedures, distribu-
tion of power, hierarchical relationships, etc.)
In the case of the political party, the way in
which party leaders recruit and retain activists
and voters also has profound consequences on
the political process, for the party occupies a
strategic place in the vertical relationship
between citizen and government. In fact, it
probably would be accurate to say that the way
party leaders go about attracting and retaining
organizational activists will be similar to the
way they go about appealing for electoral
support (Sorauf, 1964 and 1966; Eldersveld,
1964).
While many students of organization theory
and political parties have recognized the
significance of organizational survival, few
have made an explicit attempt to develop and
test a theoretical framework on the problem
(Gluck, 1970; Wilson, 1962; Eldersveld, 1964).
Representative of the importance of attracting
and retaining grass-roots activists is the
statement made by Banfield and Wilson (1963,
p. 27) in reference to the groups which
participate in big-city politics:
*My thanks to Professor Robert H. Salisbury for
his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.
An earlier version of this paper was delivered
at the 1974 meetings of the American Political
Science Association, Jung Hotel, New Orleans,
September 4-8, 1974.
Any organization must offer a continuous
stream of incentives to elicit the
activities that it requires from its
members or other ’contributors’...If it
is to grow, or even to survive, every
organization must offer a suitable mixture
of such incentives--material, non-material,
or both--and it must offer them in
sufficient quantity and without interruption.
In a more general statement, Sorauf (1964,
p.81) has recognized the importance of
examining the incentive system of political
parties. In one of the most concise statements
of the problem, he notes:
The political party has another, less
obvious aspect behind the facade of its
external image and its political functions.
Internally it is a vast network of
personalities, authority relationships, and
incentives to activity. Basic to these
relationships are the rewards and sanctions,
the political incentive system, which
the political party commands and manages.
If the party is to continue functioning
as an organization it must make ’payments’
in an acceptable ’political currency’
adequate to motivate and allocate the
labors of its workers.
The Elements of an Exchange Theory
The theory of organizations which is developed
and applied to the urban political party is
called an &dquo;exchange theory.&dquo; (Blau, 1964;
Curry and Wade, 1968; Olson, 1965; Salisbury,
1969). The theory is based upon the
following basic assumptions: (1) individuals
have a variety of needs, drives, and goals
which they seek to attain; (2) some of these
can best be achieved within the context of
organizational participation; (3) organizations
need some mechanism to influence the behavior
of its activists (i.e., to insure adherence to
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the collective goal and encourage sustained
participation). The purpose of conceptualizing
the organization as a network of exchanges is
to identify and emphasize the kinds of trans-
actions (or exchanges) which take place between
the party organization (or its leadership) and
its grass-roots activists (and voters).
Three sets of exchanges are involved in the
process of organizational survival: recruitment
exchanges, contribution exchanges, and retention
exchanges.
Recruitment exchanges focus upon the organiza-
tion’s need to attract members who will partici-
pate in it. To accomplish this the organization
offers a variety of inducements to potential
members. These inducements must be sufficiently
valuable or desirable to the potential activist
to motivate his/her participation. In most
instances they must offer something that cannot
be attained through other organizations.
Contribution exchanges focus on the activities
the individuals perform in behalf of the
organization, (i.e., in pursuit of its collective
goal). They constitute the contributions he
makes to the organization. At the same time,
contributions represent the way in which the
individual strives to realize the inducements
which initially motivated organizational
participation.
The possibility of conflict between the
contributions the individual wants to make and
those the organization leaders expect requires
a mechanism of internal discipline. This
mechanism exists in the form of retention
exchanges. Though the ultimate purpose of this
exchange is to encourage the activist to continue
organizational participation, their immediate
effect is to emphasize the rewards activists
realize from the contributions they have made to
the organization’s collective goal. At the
same time, the rewards of participation serve to
sustain the activist in the organization. Access
to the control over rewards permits an organiza-
tion’s leadership to discipline activists and
influence the direction and intensity ofitheir
participation.
The relationship between contributions and
rewards is so continual as to be almost cyclical
in nature. This is one of the reasons for
referring to the interaction between inducements,
contributions, and rewards as an incentive
system. The interaction that characterizes the
system is terminated under two circumstances.
First, participation will be terminated when no
rewards are realized from the contributions an
activist makes to the organization. Second,
participation will be terminated when the rewards
realized from contributions diminish in value or
desirability (Gluck, 1970, Chap. VIII).
Each of the exchanges between the individual
and the organization emphasizes a different
concept of organizational participation.
Recruitment exchanges focus on the inducements
which attract members to the organization;
contribution exchanges emphasize the activities
which the individual performs in pursuit of
the organization’s collective goal; retention
exchanges focus upon the rewards which
activists receive from the organization.
These concepts constitute what Sorauf (1964,
Chap. 5; 1968, Chap. 4) has called the
political incentive system.
The utility of an exchange theory of
organizational participation depends upon the
extent in which the concepts and constructs
are formulated in terms that apply to a variety
of organizations. Hence, a simple catalogue
or list of specific inducements, contributions,
and rewards would be of little value, since
the items on the list would depend to a large
extent upon the kind of organization (economic,
social, political, etc.) being examined. A
number of students of organizational partici-
pation have developed their own schemes for
classifying incentives (Barnard, 1938; Simon,
1961; Wilson and Clark, 1961). Generally
speaking, many of the classifications of
incentives are inadequate or unsatisfactory
for the purpose of developing and applying a
theory of organizational participation.
First, some are limited in applicability to
specific kinds of organizations. Salisbury
(1969), for example, argues that the Wilson-
Clark schema of incentives does not lend
itself to the analysis of interest group
exchanges. Second, in many instances the
criteria of classification are not stated
clearly. Simon (1961), for example, fails
to distinguish clearly the meaning of the
&dquo;personal reward&dquo; and &dquo;personal inducement&dquo;
categories of incentives.
The classification of incentives presented
in this analysis is based upon a distinction
between the object and value of organizational
incentives. The object of an incentive refers
to the distinction between those which are
sought for the benefit of the individual
personally and those which are sought for the
benefit of some person or group other than
the activist. The emphasis on the object of
incentives recognizes the need to provide an
answer to the question of &dquo;who benefits?&dquo; from
organizational participation. It is important
to note that our concern is with the primary
object of an incentive as perceived by the
individual. It is possible for an incentive
to benefit more than one object (eg., both
self and &dquo;significant others&dquo;). It is also
possible for an incentive to benefit an object
in recruitment exchange but not in retention
exchange, or vice versa. This problem will
be dealt with empirically by identifying and
comparing the recruitment exchanges with the
retention exchanges. Analysis of this sort
will provide some indication of the extent
to which the inducements which initiate
organizational participation are similar to
or different from rewards which sustain it.
The second dimension of organizational
incentives emphasizes their value. This
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distinction rests on the fact that some incen-
tives are either monetary or material in value,
or can be easily translated into something which
has such a value, while other incentives have no
monetary or material value and cannot be easily
translated into anything which has such a value.
Jobs, patronage, business contacts, and clients,
for example, are regarded as monetary/material
or near monetary/material in value, while status
and prestige, friendships, policy influence,
and community service are neither monetary/
material nor near monetary/material in value.
Incentives of this kind are sought for their
inherent value, either for the individual as
such or for the community in general.
Whichever is the case, however, they cannot
be easily or readily translated into monetary
or material advantages. In fact, incentives
such as policy influence, prestige, and
community service may not even be pursued for
monetary or material purposes. Instead, they
tend to be important for ideological or
psychological reasons.
These two dimensions of organizational
incentives can be combined to produce a fourfold
classification of incentives which appears in
Figure 1 below.
FIGURE 1. CLASSIFICATION OF
INCENTIVES OF ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION
Incentives falling into box &dquo;A&dquo; are tangible/
self-oriented and include such things are wages,
salaries, business contacts, patronage, contracts,
and preferential treatment. Of particular
importance is the fact that the incentives in
this category are sought for the personal benefit
of the organizational participant. This serves
to distinguish them from the tangible/other-
oriented incentives in box &dquo;B&dquo;. This category
also consists of jobs, salaries, patronage, etc.
However, in this instance the incentives are
sought for the benefit of some person or group
other than the organizational participant. The
incentives in box &dquo;C&dquo; are intangible/self-
oriented and consist of such things as social
status and prestige, opportunities for new
friendships, and the feeling of importance
which derives from association with important
and influential people. The intangible/other-
oriented incentives in box &dquo;D&dquo; include the desire
to work for the enactment of specific laws,
policies, or programs, philosophical impul-
sions to &dquo;serve the community&dquo; or fulfill a
civic obligation, and general ideological
impulsions to &dquo;serve democracy.&dquo;
The contributions to the collective goal
of the organization are a second element in
the exchange between an organization and its
activists. As used here, contributions
refer to a variety of activities and
functions--physical, intellectual, monetary,
etc.--performed by organizational activists.
In the case of political parties it is possible
to identify different kinds of contributions
to the organization’s collective goal. Our
classification includes voter-mobilization
contributions, personal-campaigning contri-
butions, party organizational contributions,
and party decision-making contributions.
The Urban Political Party Organization: An
Application of Exchange Theory
The task of an exchange theory of organiza-
tions is twofold. First, it identifies the
pattern of incentives and contributions
which enable an organization to achieve its
collective goal and survive. Second, it
explores the relationship between these
exchanges and other variables of organiza-
tional participation to determine the effects
of a particular pattern on the organization’s
internal and external characteristics.
We have chosen to apply exchange theory to
the urban political party organization for
two reasons. First, the urban party represents
an instance in which the exchanges of
organizational participation emphasize a
particular pattern of incentives and contri-
butions. The literature on urban parties
provides ample evidence of the extent to
which grass-roots activists in the urban party
organization were recruited and retained by
the effective use of material, personally-
beneficial inducements and rewards. In terms
of the classificatory scheme presented above,
the recruitment and retention of grass-roots
urban party activists emphasized tangible/
self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented
incentives. The contributions of urban party
activists also reflected a rather specific
pattern, involving the performance of voter-
mobilization and personal-campaigning contri-
butions while minimizing the involvement of
grass-roots activists in party decision-making
contributions. The traditional machine
organization was one in which activists were
recruited and retained by tangible/self-
oriented and intangible/self-oriented
incentives. In return, activists performed
contributions that enhanced the election of
the party’s candidates. They did not partici-
pate in the selection of those candidates,
the formulation of party policies, etc.
These contributions were usually made by the
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. party leaders who used their control of
governmental machinery to continue the flow of
self-oriented incentives to grass-roots
activists.
A second reason for our interest in urban
party organization is the consequences of the
exchanges which were (and perhaps still are)
characteristic of the traditional machine
organization. Though American political
parties are frequently characterized as loosely
organized and highly decentralized, with little
or no internal discipline, the classic machine
organization achieved a high degree of discipline,
centralization, and specialization of function
(Eldersveld, 1964; Sorauf, 1968; Wolfinger, 1972).
The classic machine presents a situation of
centralized power and internal discipline in
which decisions made by the leaders were
regarded as absolutely binding on a cadre of
rank-and-file activists and voters. In return
for contributions directed toward the election
of the organization’s candidates, the party
leaders provided grass-roots activists with a
continual flow of material, personally-beneficial
rewards. In return for votes on primary and
election day, party leaders provided their
voting constituency with a flow of material and
psychic rewards. The party leaders, for their
part, enjoyed almost uninterrupted and unchal-




Data on the incentives and contributions of
organizational participation were collected by
the investigator in personal interviews conducted
with a randomly selected sample of fifth
Republican and fifty Democratic committeemen in
the party organizations in Buffalo, New York.
These committeemen represent the lowest level of
activists in the organizations of their party.
An initial response rate of 90% was obtained.
The size of the sample required substitution of
those who refused to participate in the study or
were unavailable at the time field work was
being conducted.
The interview schedule was developed and pre-
tested by the investigator. The major items
were those dealing with the inducements, contri-
butions, and rewards of party participation. In
each instance respondents were asked open-ended
and fixed-alternative questions concerning the
reasons for their initial entry into the party
organization, the kinds of activities or
functions they performed, and their reasons for
continuing or terminating party participation.
Responses to the open-ended questions were coded
by the investigator and, as a check on relia-
bility, by a colleague who was not involved in
the study. Discrepancies between the two
codings were resolved by asking a second colleague
to code the open-ended responses. Fortunately,
however, this was not necessary very often.
a) Recruitment Exchanges
The analysis of the recruitment exchanges of
the urban party organization will focus upon
two dimensions of this relationship: the
kinds of incentives urban parties offer to
attract activists to the organization and
the relevant variables of participation which
influence the appeal of these incentives to
the persons they are offered to.l
The demographic character of the city is a
factor that has had considerable impact on
the urban party organization. The &dquo;typical&dquo;
machine activist was older, less educated,
and more ethnic-group oriented than the general
population (Forthal, 1946; Gosnell, 1937;
Salisbury, 1965). The data is Table 1
presents the demographic attributes of
contemporary urban party activists according
to the recruitment incentives they identified.
The data indicate that the tangible/self-
oriented and intangible/self-oriented recruit-
ment incentives are more likely to appeal to
older than to younger party activists. The
only group of activists which expressed any
substantial commitment to other-oriented
incentives, either tangible or intangible,
were those below thirty-five years of age.
Of the activists in this age group, two
identified tangible/other-oriented recruitment
incentives and five identified intangible/other-
oriented recruitment incentives as important.
The activists in the classic machine
organization had little formal education. The
lack of educational achievement generally had
two consequences for the urban party
organization. First, it meant that poorly
educated activists often depended upon the
party leaders for material well-being and
social/psychic gratification. Second, it
reinforced the monopoly which party leaders
had over decision-making activities in the
organization, since less educated activists
had neither the capability nor the desire to
engage in the involved and sometimes complex
discussions bearing on the formulation of
party policies and programs or the selection
and endorsement of party candidates (Mosher,
1935).
The data in Table 1 indicate that tangible/
self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented
recruitment incentives appeal to less educated
party activists. This is certainly the case
among the activists whose formal education
terminated with grammar school; it is also
the case for those who went up to, but no
further than, high school. It is only among
the college and graduate/professional school
attenders that we find much preference for
tangible/other-oriented and intangible/other-
oriented recruitment incentives.
The recruitment exchanges of the classic
machine organization also emphasized the
ethnic composition of the city. We have
attempted to explore the relationship between
ethnicity and the recruitment exchanges of
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Table 1 - Recruitment Exchanges and Selected Demographic Characteristics
urban party organizations by asking our
respondents to identify their nationality
background, and by dividing the responses to
distinguish &dquo;ethnic-identifiers&dquo; from &dquo;non-ethnic-identifiers&dquo; or &dquo;native Americans.&dquo;
The data in Table 1 indicate that ethnic-
identifiers have a distinct preference for the
self-oriented recruitment incentives of .
organizational participation, while those who
identified themselves as native Americans
divide almost equally between the self-oriented
and other-oriented incentives. The preference
of ethnic-identifiers for self-oriented incen-
tives is reflected in the fact that fifty-nine
(or 80%) of the respondents in this group
identified either tangible/self-oriented or
intangible/self-oriented recruitment incentives.
Among the native Americans, on the other hand,
fifteen (51.7%) identified either of the two
categories of self-oriented incentives, while
fourteen (48.3%) identified either of the two
categories of other-oriented recruitment
incentives.
The recruitment of activists to the urban
party organization was based only partially
upon the appeal of certain incentives to
persons with particular demographic attributes.
This exchange was also related to a number of
variables of party politics. Among the more
important of these are the initial source of
interest in party politics and the majority-
minority status of the party organizations.
The initial source of interest in party
politics is important because it provides the
activist with a frame of reference for orienting
himself to the party and his role in it. There
is what might be called a &dquo;group view&dquo; of
party politics which filters down from the
party leaders and sustains their conception
of the organization’s collective goal.
Students of party politics have distinguished
external sources of interest--family, friends,
and politicians--from internal sources of
interest--issues, candidates, and party. The
data in the top portion of Table 2 indicate
that externally- and internally-influenced
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Table 2 - Recruitment Exchanges and Two Variables of Party Politics
activists were both recruited to the party
organization by the appeal of self-oriented
incentives.
The recruitment exchange between the party
organization and its activists is also affected
by the distinction between the majority-
minority status of the parties. It is not
wholly coincidental that machines flourished in
the party that dominated urban government and
politics. This is so largely because access to
(or control over) governmental machinery is
necessary to provide the self-oriented incentives
which recruit and retain activists. As a
result, we would expect to find the recruitment
of activists to the majority party to emphasize
tangible/self-oriented and/or intangible/self-
oriented incentives.
Examination of the data in Table 2 reveals
that activists in both the majority and minority
urban parties are inclined to favor the two
categories of self-oriented recruitment
incentives. However, activists in the minority
party place somewhat greater emphasis on
intangible/self-oriented incentives, while
activists in the majority party emphasize
tangible/self-oriented incentives. In neither
case, however, are tangible/other-oriented or
intangible/other-oriented recruitment incentives
important to the basic recruitment exchanges of
the two urban party organizations.
b) Contribution Exchanges
Once recruited to the organization,the
activist contributes to its collective goal.
The literature on political parties provides
ample evidence of the extent to which American
parties are electoral organizations, judged
largely in terms of their ability to win
elections (Sorauf, 1968).
The contributions which activists make to
the party organization can be viewed from two
perspectives: from the perspective of the
activist and from the perspective of the
organization and its leadership. From the
perspective of the activist, contributions
are the way in which recruitment incentives are
realized. From the perspective of the
organization and its leadership, contributions
are the way in which the goal (or goals) of
the group is achieved.
Our purpose here is to identify the kinds of
variables of party politics which affect the
contributions that activists make to the party
organization and its collective goal.3 One
of these variables is majority-minority party
status. It has been argued that the contri-
butions of activists in the majority party
reflect the election orientation of that party,
while the contributions of activists in the
minority party reflect the needs of the
organization per se and are more concerned
with establishing the party at the grass-roots.
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Table 3 - Contribution Exchanges and Majority-Minority Party Status
The data in Table 3 confirm the view that
acti_vists in the majority party emphasize
election-related contributions. Better than 80%
of them identified the two categories of
contributions most directly relevant to the
electoral orientation of political parties. At
the same time, the data also indicate that the
emphasis of minority party activists on contri-
butions directed toward the organization is only
slightly greater than their emphasis on election-
related contributions. It is more probable that
minority party activists see their contributions
in terms of both election victory and establish-
ing the party at the grass-roots.
Students of party organization have argued
that the length of time a person has been in
the party organization affects the way he
orients himself to it, particularly in terms
of his role conception. There is good reason
to believe that the longer an individual has
participated in the party organization, the
more likely he is to hold the &dquo;group view&dquo; of
his role in it. This would mean that activists
who have served for a longer period of time
are more likely to emphasize the election
orientation of the party and identify election-
related activities in their contribution
exchanges. The data in the top portion of
Table 4 are concerned with the relationship
between the contribution exchanges of
activists and the length of their participa-
tion in the party organization.
Table 4 - Contribution Exchanges and Three Variables of Party Politics
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Table 4 - Contribution Exchanges and Three Variables of Party Politics (continued)
Examination of the data reveals that activists
who have been in the party organization longer
are more likely to engage in election-related
contribution exchanges. The two categories of
election-related contributions, voter-
mobilization activities and personal-campaigning
activities, are identified by an overwhelming
number of activists who have been in the party
ten years or more. Election-related contri-
butions are also salient for more recent party
activists; at least 50% of the activists who
have participated in the party organization for
less than ten years identified either voter
mobilization or personal campaigning contri-
butions. Equally interesting is the fact that
organizational contributions were identified
more frequently than party decision-making ones.
Leadership in the party organization also
affects the contribution exchanges of party
activists. While all of the respondents in the
sample were grass-roots committeemen, some
also held additional positions in the party
organization such as ward or district leader,
ward or district executive, etc. In spite of
the general salience of election-related and
organizational contributions, it should not be
surprising to find party decision-making
contributions identified more frequently by
those holding positions of leadership in the
party hierarchy. The data in the middle
portion of Table 4 indicate that party leaders
are more likely than nonleaders to identify
decision-making contributions. In fact, leaders
are also considerably less likely to engage in
the more routine and mundane contributions
relating to electoral victory. It seems that
the performance of both party organizational
and party decision-making contributions is
concentrated in the hands of the party leader-
ship.
A related variable of party politics is that
of government leadership. In addition to
occupying positions of leadership within the
party hierarchy, some activists hold elective
or appointive positions in the governmental
structure. On the basis of our findings regard-
ing the contributions of party leaders, we would
expect government leaders to perform decision-
making contributions considerably more often
than do non-leaders. At the same time, the
data indicate that government leaders are less
likely to perform voter-mobilizational and
personal-campaigning contributions. The
pattern of contribution exchanges for
activists holding positions in both party and
government suggests that the composition of
these groups is similar.
c) Retention Exchanges
One variable in particular has been employed
throughout our analysis thus far: majority-
minority party status. A basic argument in
support of this is that access to various
incentives of party participation will be
affected by whether the party enjoys control
of governmental machinery.
The relative electoral status of urban
parties is no less important in affecting
retention exchanges. The ability of the urban
party organization to provide various kinds of
rewards will be affected by its control over
or access to urban governmental structure.
This would seem to be particularly true for
the provision of tangible/self-oriented and
intangible/self-oriented rewards. The upper
portion of Table 5 arrays the data on retention
incentives according to the majority-minority
status of the two urban party organizations.
The data indicate a slight preference among
majority party activists, and a considerable
preference among minority party activists, for
intangible/self-oriented rewards. Among the
majority.party activists, seventeen identified
intangible/self-oriented retention incentives
and fifteen identified tangible/self-oriented
incentives. Among the minority party
activists, eighteen identified intangible/
self-oriented incentives while twelve identified
tangible/self-oriented ones. One conclusion
which emerges from an examination of these
data is the continued dependence of urban




Table 5 - Retention Exchanges and Three Variables of Party Politics
to reward grass-roots activists in urban parties
for the contributions they make to the organiza-
tion’s collective goal.
The orientation the activists assumes toward
the party organization is likely to affect
the distribution of retention incentives, just
as it affected the distribution of recruitment
incentives and contributions. One aspect of
this orientation toward the party consists of
the intention to remain as a party activist.
The data in the middle portion of Table 5
indicate that activists who intent to continue
in the party are more likely to identify
tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-
oriented retention incentives. In fact, these
two categories of incentives are identified by
58 of the 72 activists who intend to continue in
party politics. Equally interesting is the
fact that nineteen of the twenty-eight activists
who do not intend to remain in the party
organization identified tangible/other-
oriented and intangible/other-oriented retention
incentives. These data provide reason to
believe that tangible/other-oriented and
intangible/other-oriented are not the most
satisfying rewards of party participation,
for they appear to be unable to sustain the
participation of those activists who
identified them.
The data in the lower portion of Table 5
deal with the use of party politics as a
vehicle of upward mobility in politics. The
data indicate that tangible/self-oriented and
intangible/self-oriented incentives are
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Table 6 - Incentive Reorientation: Stability and Change in Recruitment and Retention Incentives
identified most frequently by activists who do
not aspire to a career in either the party
organization or governmental structure, while
tangible/self-oriented and intangible/other-
oriented incentives are identified most often by
those who do aspire to such a career.
Perhaps the most important factor affecting
the ability of the party organization to retain
its grass-roots activists is the extent of
stability or change in incentives from recruit-
ment to retention (Eldersveld, 1964, p. 286 ff;
Ippolito, 1969; Bowman, _et al., 1969). The
ability of the party to provide the recruitment
incentives which motivated party participation
in the first place, or to provide a satisfactory
substitute, is a significant factor in deter-
mining whether the organization will have a cadre
of grass-roots activists and maintain a viable
structure at the grass-roots. The classic
machine organization was uniquely able to retain
a core of loyal activists by using its access to
governmental structure as a source of tangible/
self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented
retention incentives.
The data in Table 6 provide some indication of
the relative stability and change in incentives
from recruitment to retention. The stability of
tangible/self-oriented and intangible/self-
oriented incentives is readily apparent from an
examination of the data. Half (20 of 40) of
those activists who were recruited by the appeal
of tangible/self-oriented incentives reported
their realization as rewards; better than half
(22 of 37) of the activists recruited by the
appeal of intangible/self-oriented incentives
reported their realization as rewards. These
two groups of activists display considerable
stability in the structure of incentives affect-
ing their party participation.
Most of the change in the structure of
incentives occurred among those recruited by
either tangible/other-oriented or intangible/
other-oriented incentives. Activists in both
groups tended to realize either tangible/self-
oriented or intangible/self-oriented incentives
as rewards. For example, only two of those
recruited by the appeal of intangible/other-
oriented incentives reported their realization
as rewards. At the same time, six of those
who were recruited by the appeal of tangible/
other-oriented incentives reported the realiza-
tion of either tangible/self-oriented or
intangible/self-oriented incentives as rewards.
It appears from our data that urban party
politics is not the most likely vehicle for




Our purpose in this paper was to identify the
basic concepts of exchange theory and apply
them to an analysis of urban party organiza-
tion. The basic emphasis of exchange theory is
on the nature and consequences of the trans-
actions which take place between the organiza-
tion and its activists in their struggle
for survival in politics.
Having identified the basic exchanges and
the concepts and constructs each involves, we
attempted to explore the relationship between
each of the concepts of exchange theory and
selected variables of party participation. On
the basis of this analysis, limited as it is,
we feel justified in concluding that the urban
party organizations we studied have been able
to persist as &dquo;machines&dquo; by appealing to and
retaining grass-roots activists with tangible/
self-oriented and intangible/self-oriented
incentives. At the same time, party leaders
are able to direct the contributions of these
activists to the performance of the variety of
activities involved in electoral victory.
This is particularly the case for the majority
(Democratic) party.
Our analysis is not without its limitations.
First, it is quite clear that certain difficul-
ties inhere in connection with employing
exchange theory to explain the survival or
persistence of an organization. The most
/114
obvious of these is the inability to test the
theory for those organizations which have failed
to survive altogether, i.e., which no longer
exist. About all we can do in such instances
is to assume, as exchange theory would hypothe-
size, that the organization failed to survive
because it ceased to offer incentives to grass-
roots activists which were of sufficient value
to elicit the contributions necessary for the
achievement of the group’s collective goal.
However, it is possible to employ exchange
theory to explore the case of organizations
which have persisted through time, albeit in a
form different from an earlier one. In this
respect it would seem profitable to use exchange
theory to account for: 1) the demise of some
urban machine organizations; 2) the persistence
of others in substantially unchanged form; and
3) the persistence of still others in modified
or completely different form (Greenstein, 1964).
A second limitation of our analysis lies in
the possibility that variables for which data
were not available are significant in the
exchanges which account for the survival and
viability of an organization.
Footnotes:
1. The open-ended measure for recruitment
incentives read as follows:
Many party committeemen like yourself
have told me of a number of different
reasons for their having become party
committeemen. From your own point of
view, what are some of the reasons that
led you to become a party committeeman?
The open-ended measure for retention incentives
read as follows:
Now let’s look at some of the experiences
you have had as a party committeeman.
Many party committeemen like yourself
have told me of a number of different
satisfactions and rewards that they have
gotten from their party work. From your
own point of view, what are some of the
satisfactions and rewards that you have
gotten from your party participation,
either for yourself or for others?
2. In the interview schedule, each respondent
was asked the following question:
If people ask you about your nationality
background, what do you say that it is?
Responses were recorded and coded both for the
specific ethnic group named and for the "ethnic"
and "native American" distinctions used in this
analysis.
3. A series of open-ended and fixed alternative
questions were used to measure the contributions
of party participation. The open-ended measure
read as follows:
Now I’d like to ask you some questions
about the job of being a party committeeman.
First, how would you describe the job
of being a party committeeman? I mean,
what are some of the important things
you do?
The first three contributions mentioned were
recorded and coded for analysis. After the
discussion was over, each respondent was
asked to designate which of the contributions
identified was "most important" in attaining
the goals of the party. The most important
contribution was used as the basis for
classifying contributions according to the
schema used in this analysis.
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